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Can sector specific REIT strategies outperform a diversified benchmark? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There have been a lot of  attempts by both practitioners and academics to develop a repeatable and consistent 
investment strategy that can outperform a relevant benchmark in absolute terms, whilst minimising the 
associated risk measures, be it volatility or maximum drawdown ( the peak to trough percentage) , to deliver 
superior risk-adjusted returns. Our interest in this topic focusses specifically on the listed real estate (REIT) 
sector, which is one of 11 separate equity sectors accounting for around 3.5% of the global equity market. The 
generally accepted benchmark for REIT performance is the FTSE/EPRA/NAREIT  Index which comprises the 
largest REITs, weighted according to their free float market capitalisation (i.e. investible size). Its composition is 
therefore agnostic to the type of asset (retail, office, industrial etc.) owned by the REITs.The asset composition 
of the companies in the index is extremely important to fund managers who specialise in the real estate 
sector, so it is important to isolate the impact on performance of selecting companies by asset type not size (as 
measured by free float market capitalisation).  Companies who have a dominant asset type in their portfolio 
are designated Specialist (as opposed to Diversified) REITs.  In the benchmark the changes to weightings are 
determined by the change in the free float market capitalisation. A key element of the paper is determining 
whether an automated trading strategy can be developed to change the portfolio weightings, to improve 
performance, independent of changes in market capitalisation. .  
In this paper   two specific elements have been examined relating to the performance of portfolios of specialist 
REITs compared to that of a diversified benchmark: 
Firstly, whether automated portfolio weightings of sector specific REITs can be created that can outperform a 
diversified free-float market capitalisation based FTSE/EPRA/NAREIT EPRA benchmark. In contrast to the free-
float market capitalisation weighting of the benchmark index,    four alternative portfolio weighting strategies 
are considered, namely;  Equal Weight, Minimum Variance, Maximum Sharpe and Risk Parity. These result in 
very different portfolio weightings to the index. The size of the US REIT market allows a high degree of 
specialisation amongst the individual companies, which enables investors to assemble portfolios with 
weightings based on individual property types rather than merely market capitalisation 
Secondly, given that Maximum Drawdown for single sectors (be it asset specific such as Offices, or indeed 
equity specific such as REITs) is a major concern for practitioners we investigate whether the application of 
automated Trend Following strategies as an overlay to the initial portfolios can improve risk-adjusted results. 
The data used for this study is from NAREIT the US for the period 1995-2015 and from EPRA for the extended 
dataset which includes Europe and Asia for the period 2007-2015. 
The paper is structured as follows:  
The next section of the paper (Section 2) deals with the prior literature,  as it relates to the relative 
performance of REITs that specialise in one sector (such as offices) compared to those which hold a portfolio  
diversified across sectors, and  with regard to the automated trading strategies ( such as Momentum and 
Trend Following) which could be  deployed. In this section we also provide the behavioural finance rationale 
for the success of these strategies.  
Section 3 outlines the US REIT sector data used and our methodology. The first stage of the analysis is to 
compute the base level returns and chosen risk characteristics for each of the sectors.  The second stage is to 
calculate the correlations between the sectors so that we can calculate the benefits of combining the different 
sectors in a portfolio, The third stage constructs portfolios using 4 different weightings, to show how the 
results differ from a free-float market capitalisation weighting of the benchmark index, and finally the fourth 
stage is to apply an automated trading strategy to the portfolios, in this case a Trend Following Strategy This 
methodology is first employed on the US data for the full period 1995-2015, and then on a global sample 
(Global, European, UK Asia and US) over the shorter time period available 2007-2015.  
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Section 4 details the results of our study, and Section 5 provides the conclusions we draw from the results. 
2. Literature Review  
Although specialisation is welcomed by investors as it provides a greater level of choice, it is not clear, 
that specialisation per se leads to enhanced performance. Ro and Ziobrowski (2011) amongst others 
found no evidence of superior performance by REITs specialising in a single property type compared to 
REITs holding a diversified portfolio. Indeed they also found that specialised REITs carried a higher level of 
volatility (risk). However, by focussing purely on the underlying property type these results may be 
masking other factors which have been shown to contribute to performance such as size, leverage, and 
management. In addition, by taking specialised REITs as a whole this may ignore the fact that certain 
sectors (for example Industrial) do outperform diversified REITs over most periods of a cycle, after 
adjusting for these other factors. In order to isolate the pure impact of specialisation for this study we 
have put together portfolios of specialised REITs using non free-float market capitalisation weightings, to 
ensure that pure size (as measured by free-float market capitalisation) is not the primary driver of 
performance. We then overlay an automated trading strategy, incorporating trend following to the 
portfolios to determine whether this dynamic approach can outperform the static strategy. . There are 
several reasons why we use these specific automated trading strategies, which have proved resilient in other 
markets.  The classic equity strategy highlighted by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) involves buying the 'winners' 
over the past 6-12 months and selling the 'losers' over the same period. This is frequently referred to as cross-
sectional momentum or relative momentum by Antonacci (2012). Studies by Erb and Harvey (2006) and Miffre 
and Rallis (2007) demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach within commodity markets. 
An alternative type of momentum investing is where one is interested only in the direction of prices or returns 
rather than how they fare against their peer group. This type of activity is known as trend following (other 
names include time series momentum and absolute momentum) and is frequently used by Commodity Trading 
Advisors (CTAs) (see Szakmary et al, 2010). As examples, trend following rules may use the current price 
relative to a moving average (Faber, 2007), or the length of time that excess returns have been positive over a 
range of timeframes (Hurst et al, 2012). Indeed, Hurst et al (2012, p.2) make the following distinction: 
“The most basic trend-following strategy is time series momentum – going long markets with recent positive 
returns and shorting those with recent negative returns. The aim is always to trade in the direction of the 
prevailing price, i.e. when prices are rising long positions are taken and when prices are falling then cash or 
short positions are taken.” 
Evidence for the effectiveness of trend following strategies has been presented by Faber (2007), ap Gwilym et 
al (2010) and Moskowitz et al (2012), amongst others. Clare et al (2016) demonstrate that when relative 
momentum is compared to trend following it is the latter that provides by far the more impressive investment 
performance enhancement for a variety of asset classes. Moskowitz et al (2012) find significant ‘‘time series 
momentum’’ in equity index, currency, commodity and bond futures for each of the 58 liquid instruments 
considered. They find persistence in returns for one to 12 months that partially reverses over longer horizons, 
consistent with sentiment theories of initial under-reaction and delayed over-reaction. 
We believe that there are a number of factors which can explain the outperformance of the trend-following 
strategies, which is consistent with previous evidence, namely; 
a) Continuation, reversals and behavioural finance 
Trend-following, often known as time series momentum, though they are not necessarily synonymous as we 
point out in the introduction, is closely related to  the predictions of some behavioural and rational asset 
pricing theories such as  Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) 
and Hong and Stein (1999). The empirical findings by Moskowitz et al (2012) and others that for a wide range 
of asset classes there is  positive time series momentum that partially reverses over the long-term may well be 
consistent with initial under-reaction and delayed over-reaction; indeed theories of sentiment can produce 
these return patterns (Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007). 
Trend following strategies work if price trends continue more often than not (e.g. see Hurst et al., 2012), but 
why should these trends continue? Much of our understanding of this is based on the work of Tversky and 
Kahneman (1979) and, in this context is typically related to the behavioural biases involved in under reaction 
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of market prices to new information. If prices initially underreact to either good or bad news, trends tend to 
continue as prices slowly move to fully reflect changes in fundamental value. These trends may continue 
further to the extent that investors chase the trend via herding behaviour, which can lead to an overreaction in 
prices beyond fundamental value. Naturally all trends will eventually come to an end as deviations from fair 
value cannot continue indefinitely. This is the domain of Managed Futures’ investing, and has been applied 
with some success across many asset classes (e.g. Hurst et al., 2012) and indeed with particular success during 
extreme up and down markets. 
Moskowitz et al (2012) find that the dominant force to both time-series and relative momentum strategies is 
significant positive auto-covariance between a security’s excess return next month and it’s 1-year lagged 
return. This evidence is consistent with both initial under-reaction and delayed over-reaction theories of 
sentiment as the time series momentum effect partially reverses after one year. They also investigate the link 
between time series momentum returns and the positions of speculators and hedgers, finding that speculators 
profit from time series momentum at the expense of hedgers which is consistent with speculators earning a 
premium via time series momentum for providing liquidity to hedgers. 
So we believe that the raison d’etre for the existence of trends lies firmly in the area of behavioural finance. A 
major shift in some fundamental variable driving an asset price is adopted into the market slowly revealing an 
initial under reaction to the new information, possibly due to the slow diffusion of news (Hong and Stein, 
1999); the trend in price then overextends due to herding effects and finally results in a reversal. Research has 
linked the initial under-reaction to behavioural features and frictions that slow down the price discovery 
process, these include: 
(i) Anchoring 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), Edwards (1968) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974) find that historical 
data provide a natural anchor for people and their views adjust slowly to new information: anchoring leads to 
under-reaction to news. 
(ii) The disposition effect 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) and Frazzini (2006) note that people tend to sell winners too early as they like to 
realize gains, thus slowing down the rise in price, and they hold losers too long as they wish to avoid realizing 
losses, hence slowing any downward move in prices. Barberis (2013) points out that this argument follows 
directly from prospect theory. Holding losers demonstrates risk-seeking behaviour by investors when they 
make losses. This is developed further by Barberis and Xiong (2012). 
Of course, once a trend has become established there are a number of features which can extend the trend:  
(iii) Herding 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, (1992), De Long et al. (1990), Hong and Stein (1999), and others argue 
that when prices start moving up or down for a while then some traders will naturally join the bandwagon and 
the herding effect will feed on itself; this has been observed with equity analysts’ forecasts and mutual fund 
investors. 
(iv) Confirmation bias/representativeness 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) show that people tend to look for information which they already believe and 
take recent price changes as representative of the future. Over-confidence and self-attribution confirmation 
biases are present (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998) as is the representativeness heuristic 
(Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998), hence more investors join the trend: it becomes self-reinforcing. Of 
course eventually prices extend far beyond underlying fundamental value and the trend evaporates: prices 
may move sideways for a period until new information moves prices once more. 
b) Rules-based investing strategies and behavioural finance 
A key feature of both time-series and cross-section momentum is that they are ‘rules-based’. Ever since 
Michaud (1989) questioned the efficacy of combining asserts in Mean Variance Efficient portfolios, there has 
been interest in simple alternative approaches which do not involve generating expected returns, variances 
and covariances: simple rules may include equal dollar weights or, indeed, equal risk weights, so-called ‘risk 
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parity’. The latter has been especially popular of late, probably because of the low interest rate environment. 
Some researchers have compared such simple rules with more conventional rules due to Markowitz, both with 
and without perfect foresight, and find that the former are superior in terms of Sharpe and other performance 
metrics (see, for example, Chaves et al., 2011). 
Why should such simple rules perform so well? We believe that the discipline of rules-based construction has 
clear advantages over attempting to forecast returns in a noisy world which also incorporates substantial 
behavioural biases: over-reliance on recent information is but one simple example of biases which could 
adversely affect such forecasts. Simple rules avoid behavioural biases in portfolio formation. 
 
 
3. Data & Methodology 
 
The main dataset is  for 10 NAREIT US REIT sector and subsector indices for the period 1994-2015, namely 
Office, Industrial, Shopping Centres, Regional Malls, Free Standing Retail, Residential, Diversified, 
Lodging/Resorts, Self-Storage and Healthcare. The first year of data is frequently required for calculations so 
results are reported from 1995-2015. All observations are monthly and in US dollars with total returns used 
unless otherwise stated. Where cash is referred to, we use three-month US Treasury Bills. 
For a shorter period of international data   EPRA indices are used for the period 2006-2015. The five 
regions/countries are Global, UK, US, Eurozone and Asia and each has the following five sectors: Diversified, 
Industrial, Office, Residential and Retail. Once again, all observations are monthly in US dollars and the first 
year of data is used in calculations. 
The first stage of the analysis provides us with an indication of how each individual sector has performed. We 
compute the base level returns and chosen risk characteristics (in this case volatility, Sharpe Ratio, and 
Maximum Drawdown) for each of the 10 US sectors over the full period, 1995-2015.  The results are shown in 
Table 1.  
 The second stage provides us with an indication as to whether there will be risk reduction benefit from 
diversification, or whether all the sectors move in a similar manner. We calculate the correlations between the 
sectors so that we can calculate the benefits of combining the different sectors in a portfolio, which we show 
by way of a mean-variance efficient frontier (Table 2 and Figure 1). This  
The third stage attempts to reduce the size bias which is present in free float market capitalisation indices, and 
isolate the specific sector impact.  To achieve this, we construct portfolios using 4 different weightings, to 
show how the results differ from a free-float market capitalisation weighting of the benchmark index. They are 
Miinimum Variance (MV), Maximum Sharpe (MS), Equal Weight (EW) and Risk Parity (RP).  Specifically, at the 
beginning of each annual period we calculate the portfolio weights based on the four strategies described 
earlier using only information that was known at that point. The portfolios are then held for twelve months 
before recalculation takes place, including the returns data that has become available during that time, and 
new weights are assigned. .   
The fourth stage is to see whether a dynamic portfolio, which uses an automated trading strategy, can 
generate risk-adjusted outperformance.  We have chosen to apply a Trend Following Strategy to the portfolios. 
. Our trend following methodology simply compares, at the end of each month, a total return index for a given 
sector with the average of the previous 10-months’ values; if  it lies above the average then we put that 
proportion of the portfolio into that risky asset; if it lies below we shift that part into cash or similar ‘risk-free’. 
We have compared this rule with a myriad other rules found in the literature in an earlier paper (Clare et al 
(2012) and found it robust across assets and time-periods.  The results are then compared with that of the 
benchmark index to see if there is an improvement in risk-adjusted returns.  
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 This methodology is first employed on the US data for the full period 1995-2015, and then on a global sample 
(Global, European, UK Asia and US) over the shorter time period available 2007-2015.  
 
 
4. Results 
To establish the base level of sector returns, and differences in risk characteristics (specifically volatility and 
maximum drawdown) we calculated the key metrics for each sector. Table 1 reports these summary statistics 
for the ten sectors (all in USD). .  
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics for REIT Sector: 1995-2015 
 
Offic
e 
Industr
ial 
Shoppi
ng 
Centre
s 
Regio
nal 
Malls 
Free 
Standi
ng 
Resident
ial 
Diversifi
ed 
Lodgin
g/ 
Resort
s 
SelfStora
ge 
Healthc
are 
Annualiz
ed 
Return 
(%) 
11.5
7 8.38 10.66 13.49 13.99 12.85 9.43 5.33 18.03 12.74 
Annualiz
ed 
Volatilit
y (%) 
21.7
6 30.90 22.21 26.38 17.77 19.51 21.28 31.04 19.91 20.99 
Sharpe 
Ratio 0.42 0.19 0.37 0.42 0.65 0.53 0.33 0.09 0.78 0.49 
Maximu
m 
Drawdo
wn (%) 
70.9
0 85.37 72.91 82.02 37.93 67.01 68.85 83.89 51.63 48.07 
Jarque-
Bera 
test 
 390.
5  5493.3  1313.3 
 3194.
5  29.9  212.6  1023.6 
 1854.
8  54.5  127.3 
 
The last line in Table 1 presents the familiar Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality for each of the series.  The 
test statistic measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series with those from the normal 
distribution, and is distributed as χ
2
 with 2 degrees of freedom, under the null hypothesis of normality.   These 
Jarque-Bera tests show that all of these series are non-normal.  This non-normality is due, at least in part, to 
the drawdowns experienced in these instruments; and it is this issue that our investment strategy addresses.    
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We observe considerable variation in the performance of the sectors with Self Storage having the highest 
return over the period at 18.0% and Lodging/Resorts the lowest at 5.3%. These also have the highest and 
lowest Sharpe ratios at 0.78 and 0.09 respectively. Industrial and Lodging/Resorts are the most volatile sectors 
with both scoring over 30% on an annualised basis, whilst Free Standing and Residential are the lowest at 
under 20%. During the GFC The financial crisis many sectors suffered drawdowns of in excess of 50%.  
The fact that there is considerable variation in performance between sectors offers encouragement that 
through combinations of sectors we may be able to find improved risk/reward trade-off.  
Having seen the level of absolute risk and return the next stage is to examine the correlations between 
sectors, as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2 
Correlations Between REIT Sectors 
 
Offi
ce 
Indust
rial 
Shopp
ing 
Centre
s 
Regio
nal 
Malls 
Free 
Standi
ng 
Residen
tial 
Diversif
ied 
Lodging/Re
sorts 
Self 
Stora
ge 
Healthc
are 
Office 1.00          
Industrial 0.82 1.00         
Shopping 
Centres 0.89 0.86 1.00        
Regional 
Malls 0.86 0.80 0.91 1.00       
Free 
Standing 0.76 0.71 0.78 0.71 1.00      
Residential 0.85 0.70 0.82 0.78 0.67 1.00     
Diversified 0.90 0.78 0.88 0.86 0.73 0.84 1.00    
Lodging/Re
sorts 0.77 0.69 0.76 0.80 0.57 0.71 0.82 1.00   
Self Storage 0.77 0.69 0.81 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.76 0.63 1.00  
Healthcare 0.76 0.74 0.81 0.74 0.78 0.71 0.74 0.60 0.77 1.00 
 
 As might be expected when comparing different sectors of the same asset class (REITs), all of the correlations 
are positive, I.e. they move in the same direction,  with an average value of +0.77 and a range of +0.57 to 
+0.91. Lodging/Resorts had the lowest average correlation with the other sectors and Shopping Centres had 
the highest. We then put the various risk/reward trade-offs into the form of a mean-variance efficient frontier 
(figure 1). This will help us show how the expected return is maximised for a given level of risk.  
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This is constructed with the benefit of hindsight over the whole data period.  
In addition, we have indicated four standard portfolios on the chart in Figure 1 which have different weights to 
a standard free-float market capitalisation weighted index.  They have each been chosen for a specific purpose 
as follows: 
Minimum Variance: This methodology seeks to produce a portfolio with the lowest level of risk for the 
expected return 
Maximum Sharpe: This methodology produces the optimal combination of risk and return, i.e. at the 
intersection of the tangency line and Efficient Frontier (see Figure 1) 
Equal weight: This methodology eliminates the impact of size by treating each constituent similarly. 
Risk Parity: This methodology seeks to allocate weights such that each constituent has a similar level of risk, so 
portfolio weights are proportional to the inverse of observed volatility. 
 
. The first two, Minimum Variance (MV) and Maximum Sharpe (MS), are efficient portfolios that lie on the 
frontier. Our remaining portfolios are Equal Weight (EW) and Risk Parity (RP), i.e. each asset contributes the 
same amount of risk to the total, which are not efficient and lie away from the frontier. In this case, both EW 
and RP are found in the bottom right-hand corner of the chart. They each display returns that are considerably 
less than the Minimum Variance portfolio and volatilities some 5-6% greater. The initial impression is thus that 
these popular strategies have performed exceedingly poorly but we caution this analysis was done with 
perfect hindsight. 
We next consider how the strategies perform when they are constructed based on data available at the time 
(i.e. a rolling time-period) and used to make portfolio allocations for the following year. Specifically, at the 
beginning of each annual period we calculate the portfolio weights based on the four strategies described 
earlier using only information that was known at that point. The portfolios are then held for twelve months 
before recalculation takes place, including the returns data that has become available during that time, and 
new weights are assigned. 
Table 3 reports the performance of the four strategies based on data available at the time plus the NAREIT 
Equity REIT index as a benchmark.  
Table 3 
Performance of Standard Portfolios Based on Information Available at Time 
 
Equity REIT 
Index 
Equal 
Weight 
Minimum 
Variance 
Maximum 
Sharpe Risk Parity 
Annualized Return (%) 11.10 12.52 12.79 11.67 12.77 
Annualized Volatility (%) 19.93 20.09 18.21 22.13 19.73 
Sharpe Ratio 0.43 0.50 0.56 0.41 0.52 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 68.30 66.82 61.08 73.81 65.77 
 
The results are very different to the observations made from the efficient frontier. Firstly, the Maximum 
Sharpe portfolio now has the lowest return of any strategy. In addition, it has clearly the highest volatility and 
has a Sharpe ratio that is below that of the benchmark. The Minimum Variance portfolio and Risk Parity 
portfolios now have almost exactly the same return at around 12.8% although the former does have a slightly 
lower volatility at 18.2% versus 19.7%. The gap between the two is nothing like it was, though, in the efficient 
frontier. This is also true of the Equal Weight portfolio which returned 12.5% with a volatility of 20.1%. From 
the standpoint of combining sectors, the fact that three of the four strategies outperformed the benchmark 
both on a risk-adjusted and unadjusted basis is encouraging. The excess returns displayed by the Minimum 
Variance portfolio is very much consistent with the evidence presented by Falkenstein (2012) across a wide 
range of asset classes. 
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Figures 2, 3 and 4 (in the Appendix) show the asset allocation of the Minimum Variance, Maximum Sharpe and 
Risk Parity strategies at the beginning of each annual period respectively. Looking firstly at Figure 2, it can be 
seen that the Minimum Variance portfolio has typically been dominated by two or three sectors with 
occasional small allocations to one or two more sectors. As more data became available, the portfolio 
converged towards a dominant weighting in Free Standing with smaller allocations to Residential and Self-
Storage. In the last six years of the study (2009-15) the weights showed very little variation. 
Figure 3 shows the asset allocation of the Maximum Sharpe portfolio. This is typically dominated by one or two 
sectors with the asset allocation having converged to a large position in Self Storage and a smaller position in 
Free Standing. The portfolio weights appear more volatile in this portfolio compared to the Minimum Variance 
although both tend to be heavily concentrated in just a handful of sectors. 
The final portfolio is Risk Parity and this is shown in Figure 4. We note this has much greater diversity 
compared to the previous two strategies with all ten sectors having a portfolio weight in every annual period. 
The weights remain fairly constant over time and the composition of this portfolio is similar to an equal weight 
portfolio with some small tactical adjustments. This is borne out by the results we observed earlier in Table 3 
where there was little difference between the Risk Parity and Equal Weight strategies. 
Despite the benefits of combining REIT sectors relative to the benchmark, (annualized returns are higher as 
shown in Table3) we note that the maximum drawdown of the portfolios (>60% as per Table 3) remained high. 
We define maximum drawdown as the percentage change in the portfolios from peak to trough over the 
period.  Even the low volatility Minimum Variance portfolio suffered a maximum drawdown in excess of 60%. 
The fundamental reasons for this high figure are: 1) We are dealing with a single asset class where the sectors 
tend to move in a similar direction, so mitigating diversification benefits are low. 2) The leverage of the REITs 
exacerbates value declines in their underlying assets 3) REIT valuation shifts can be dramatic (e.g. from a 25% 
premium to NAV to a 35% discount to NAV) which enhances the decline at certain stages of the cycle.  
Therefore, we are keen to see if we can minimise this particular risk metric by employing an automated trading 
strategy. One strategy that has proved effective across a wide variety of asset classes for reducing volatility 
and drawdown, whilst still preserving much of the return, is trend following. An extensive literature is available 
that describes simple mechanical rules that can be used as an overlay on existing portfolios. For examples, see 
Faber (2007) and Clare et al (2016) for multi-asset, Szacmary et al (2010) for commodities and Moss et al 
(2015) for real estate whilst Hurst et al (2012) report for over 200 years of data using futures markets. 
In this paper we are going to use the simple rule proposed by Faber (2009) whereby if the sector index is 
trading above its 10-month moving average we take a long position and otherwise we invest the allocation 
within the portfolio to Treasury Bills. This calculation is repeated on a monthly basis. We retain the four 
portfolios described earlier for asset allocation purposes and, by way of interest, also apply trend following to 
the benchmark index. 
Table 4 reports the results of the addition of the trend following strategy.  
Table 4 
Performance of Standard Portfolios Based on Information Available at Time with Trend Following 
 
Equity REIT 
Index 
Equal 
Weight 
Minimum 
Variance 
Maximum 
Sharpe Risk Parity 
Annualized Return (%) 10.84 12.70 12.70 14.01 12.80 
Annualized Volatility (%) 14.49 12.38 13.10 13.52 12.36 
Sharpe Ratio 0.58 0.82 0.78 0.85 0.83 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 45.18 27.90 35.21 23.31 28.46 
 
Looking firstly at the benchmark we note a small decline in return of around 30 basis points annually but 
volatility is now less than three-quarters of its previous level giving a Sharpe ratio of 0.58 versus 0.43 without 
trend following. The maximum drawdown has also been reduced to 45% from 68%. Moving next to the four 
sector combination strategies, we observe little change in return as a result of trend following with the 
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exception of the Maximum Sharpe portfolio which has improved from 11.7% to 14.0%. The big difference 
comes in the volatility and drawdowns where the former is now, on average, less than two-thirds of the level 
prior to the implementation of the trend following filter. Average Sharpe ratios are now 0.82 compared to 
0.50. The maximum drawdowns have declined substantially through the application of trend following. All of 
the strategies previously had values in excess of 60% whereas now three of the four are under 30% with only 
Minimum Variance above at 35%. All of the four strategies are now a substantial improvement on the 
benchmark, particularly when the index is considered without trend following. 
We next consider the evidence using the international dataset. Table 5 shows summary statistics for the five 
regions/countries over the shorter time period. 
Table 5 
Summary Statistics of International Sectors 2007-15 
 Diversified Industrial Office Residential Retail 
Global      
Annualized Return (%) -0.90 -6.19 2.29 6.50 2.76 
Annualized Volatility (%) 23.50 35.05 20.65 22.19 22.81 
Sharpe Ratio -0.07 -0.20 0.07 0.26 0.09 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 68.76 86.25 63.98 62.58 68.92 
      
UK      
Annualized Return (%) -4.58 -11.05 2.40 -6.11 -7.41 
Annualized Volatility (%) 25.21 40.98 27.45 52.46 27.75 
Sharpe Ratio -0.21 -0.29 0.06 -0.13 -0.29 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 80.73 91.62 83.17 91.06 82.84 
      
US      
Annualized Return (%) 1.14 -3.51 1.52 8.17 3.91 
Annualized Volatility (%) 29.99 44.66 28.28 25.27 30.91 
Sharpe Ratio 0.01 -0.10 0.03 0.29 0.10 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 72.61 85.46 72.13 66.49 75.30 
      
Eurozone      
Annualized Return (%) -1.52 3.76 -2.44 -3.76 1.96 
Annualized Volatility (%) 26.24 32.40 24.32 36.08 26.20 
Sharpe Ratio -0.09 0.09 -0.13 -0.12 0.05 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 68.86 75.82 53.19 88.21 55.33 
      
Asia      
Annualized Return (%) -3.39 -6.73 2.88 4.91 2.78 
Annualized Volatility (%) 26.37 32.77 20.82 37.36 19.51 
Sharpe Ratio -0.16 -0.23 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 70.93 88.81 58.54 68.06 63.30 
 
Average returns were highest in the US and lowest in the UK, with the UK also displaying very high volatility 
and large drawdowns. By sector, residential had the highest risk-adjusted returns and industrial the lowest. 
Following the same pattern as Table 3, we form standard portfolios within each region using the five available 
sectors. The results are displayed in Table 6.  
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Table 6 
Performance of Standard International Portfolios 2007-15 
 
Benchmark 
Equal 
Weight 
Minimum 
Variance 
Maximum 
Sharpe Risk Parity 
Global      
Annualized Return (%) 1.93 1.39 1.42 3.79 1.53 
Annualized Volatility (%) 22.07 22.96 21.62 22.64 22.63 
Sharpe Ratio 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.03 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 67.20 69.99 69.67 70.28 69.50 
      
UK      
Annualized Return (%) -5.04 -4.56 -4.53 -1.38 -4.37 
Annualized Volatility (%) 26.24 30.68 26.07 43.12 29.46 
Sharpe Ratio -0.22 -0.17 -0.20 -0.05 -0.17 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 82.38 85.61 82.32 87.21 85.00 
      
US      
Annualized Return (%) 4.27 2.83 2.87 -2.53 2.94 
Annualized Volatility (%) 26.89 28.67 30.55 43.19 28.46 
Sharpe Ratio 0.13 0.07 0.07 -0.08 0.08 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 69.88 73.48 78.46 88.22 73.54 
      
Eurozone      
Annualized Return (%) -0.02 0.53 -3.07 0.57 0.15 
Annualized Volatility (%) 25.43 25.61 25.44 26.16 25.51 
Sharpe Ratio -0.03 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.02 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 64.40 66.96 57.74 60.12 66.04 
      
Asia      
Annualized Return (%) 0.44 1.16 3.73 1.36 1.07 
Annualized Volatility (%) 23.26 23.35 19.50 30.11 22.23 
Sharpe Ratio -0.01 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.01 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 67.60 69.66 59.77 61.07 68.16 
 
In the left-hand column we report the (free-float market capitalisation weighted)  benchmark index for each of 
the five regions as a comparison against the alternative weighting methods. There is little evidence found here 
to suggest that one portfolio is clearly better than any of the others. For example, the Maximum Sharpe 
method performs very well in the Global space but very poorly in the US. Similar variation is evident with the 
Minimum Variance method in Asia and the Eurozone. The Equal Weight and Risk Parity portfolios behave fairly 
similarly throughout, this is consistent with the earlier evidence presented in Figure 4. 
Finally, in Table 7 we present the results of the same portfolio formations as Table 6 but this time with the 
inclusion of the trend following filter.  
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Table 7 
Performance of Standard International Portfolios with Trend Following 2007-15 
 
Benchmark 
Equal 
Weight 
Minimum 
Variance 
Maximum 
Sharpe Risk Parity 
Global      
Annualized Return (%) 6.64 5.63 6.61 6.76 5.70 
Annualized Volatility (%) 11.47 10.69 10.70 12.70 10.56 
Sharpe Ratio 0.51 0.46 0.55 0.47 0.47 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 13.61 13.73 12.92 24.57 13.53 
      
UK      
Annualized Return (%) 6.13 8.91 8.46 12.90 8.79 
Annualized Volatility (%) 14.30 15.46 13.91 23.96 14.86 
Sharpe Ratio 0.38 0.53 0.55 0.51 0.54 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 17.70 18.85 15.69 27.41 18.24 
      
US      
Annualized Return (%) 8.55 5.17 7.98 9.94 5.56 
Annualized Volatility (%) 14.14 15.05 16.74 16.79 15.04 
Sharpe Ratio 0.55 0.29 0.43 0.55 0.32 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 20.39 31.93 33.40 24.10 31.85 
      
Eurozone      
Annualized Return (%) 2.50 4.18 -1.14 1.79 3.71 
Annualized Volatility (%) 15.16 13.55 13.92 15.70 13.53 
Sharpe Ratio 0.12 0.25 -0.14 0.07 0.22 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 22.27 19.80 29.77 25.13 19.84 
      
Asia      
Annualized Return (%) 3.32 3.96 6.14 -3.38 3.97 
Annualized Volatility (%) 12.33 11.96 12.12 20.00 11.43 
Sharpe Ratio 0.21 0.27 0.44 -0.21 0.28 
Maximum Drawdown (%) 23.07 19.28 19.13 56.32 19.11 
 
 
Although the dataset for the international indices is shorter in length, it still encompasses the 2007-09 period 
where the listed real estate sector in general suffered very large drawdowns. The trend following filter ensured 
that a large part of the GFC period was spent in Treasury Bills and the results reflect the benefit of this 
allocation. Average returns are over 5% per annum higher compared to Table 6 and volatility is over a third 
lower. Sharpe ratios average 0.34 with trend following as opposed to zero without. The average maximum 
drawdown falls to 23% compared to over 70% previously. 
  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have investigated whether combinations of REIT sectors can be created that can outperform 
the benchmark. We have considered four strategies of Equal Weight, Minimum Variance, Maximum Sharpe 
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and Risk Parity. With the benefit of perfect hindsight the efficient portfolios completely dominated their 
inefficient counterparts but when these were calculated based on only information available at the time and 
used to make portfolio allocations for the future the results were very different. The Minimum Variance 
portfolio continued to show some outperformance compared to the Equal Weight and Risk Parity portfolios 
but this was much diminished, whilst the Maximum Sharpe portfolio was the clear laggard. Both of the 
efficient portfolios tended to have large weightings to relatively few sectors, particularly the Maximum Sharpe 
portfolio, compared to the other strategies. Three of the four strategies were shown to outperform the 
benchmark index on a risk-adjusted basis. 
One observation from the results was that the maximum drawdowns of the strategies tended to be rather 
high, indeed as was the benchmark. We therefore investigated whether the application of a trend following 
filter could be used to improve portfolio performance. It was observed that generally there was little change in 
the portfolio returns but volatility typically fell by over a third from its previous level and maximum 
drawdowns were, on average, less than half of the previous values. The risk-adjusted performance improved 
dramatically as a result.  
We believe that the two step process of forming combinations of REIT sectors with the subsequent addition of 
a trend following overlay is beneficial relative to a passive benchmark investment. This has clear implications 
for practitioners, who can use this methodology to create portfolios which satisfy the criteria of improving risk-
adjusted returns, with weightings directly related to the specific characteristics of REITs, i.e. the underlying 
asset type. In addition the use of proven automated trading strategies of trend following and momentum 
allow an element of performance enhancing active management without the additional cost of active 
management fees or the uncertainty of the discretionary element on performance.  
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